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Notes
DISCHARGE OF SURETY BY FAILURE OF CREDITOR TO SUE PRINCIPAL AFTER NOTICE FROM
SURETY-In most jurisdictions the rule is that a creditor
not only owes no duty of active vigilance to collect from
the principal but neither can such a duty be imposed upon
him by a notice from the surety to sue the principal. The
surety is required to pay the obligation and collect from the
principal.' In many states, however, statutes have been
passed giving the surety the right to require the creditor
to bring suit against the principal, and releasing the surety
upon the failure of the creditor to comply with a notice to
sue the principal. No such statute exists in Pennsylvania
because the courts early established this rule upon equitable grounds and the only legislation on the subject is confined tca provision that the notice given by the surety must
be in writing and signed by the surety giving the notice.2
The existence of the rule in Pennsylvania is an interesting illustration of the expedients to which its courts
resorted in their effort to enforce equitable rights in common law actions, due to the nonexistence of a court of
chancery in Pennsylvania when the law on this subject
was in the making.
The earliest judicial statement in support of the doctrine was in Eddowes v. Niell, in which it was said: "It is
true, however, that the gross negligence of a creditor, even
of the obligee in a bond, may operate to discharge a surety;
as where the obligee is requested by the surety to proceed
against the principal, in order to save the debt; if he neglects or refuses to do so, the surety, both in law and
equity, will be exonerated."
This was quoted and followed in Cope v. Smith's Exrs.',
in which Chief Justice Tilghman says: "Although the
surety is positively bound for payment of the whole debt,
and there is no distinction in the bond between principal
and surety, yet it would be against good conscience for the
obligee to refuse to bring suit against the principal, though
requested to do so by the surety, who was apprehensive
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2

R. C. L. 1124 and 1036; 32 Cyc. 99; L. R. A. 1918 C. 11.

Act of May 14, 1874, P. L. 157, 4 Purdon 4520.
34 Dall. 133, (1793).
48 S. & R. 110, (1822).
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that the debt might fall upon him by delay. * * * An equitable defense may be supported on a request in pais, provided it be proved clearly and beyond all doubt, and
provided the request be positive, and accompanied with a
declaration that unless it be complied with the surety will
be considered as discharged."
In this leading case reference is made to the fact that
chancery would compel a creditor to sue the principal;
debtor and that unless a demand in pais were held to be
sufficient in Pennsylvania, the equity of the surety would
be sacrificed, there being no court of equity in Pennsylvania. The added suggestion that it would be best to put
such requests to sue in writing remained unnoticed by the
legislature for over fifty years.
In Gardnerv. FerrcC,5 the notice to sue was given by the
widow of a deceased surety and it was held that the right
to give such a notice passed to the surety's executor. But
it was observed by Judge Gibson that if the principal is
shown to have been insolvent when the notice wq given,
failure to sue does not work a discharge of the surety, as
he is not hurt. It also appeared that the creditor offered
to permit suit on the bond in his name and it was declared
that this was a sufficient performance of the creditor's duty
in these cases.
In Erie Bank v. Gibson,6 Judge Rogers observed that the
merit of the requirement that a request to sue be accompanied by an explicit declaration that, if suit be not
brought, the surety will consider himself discharged, lies
in the fact that the creditor is thus put on his guard and it
is reasonable that he should then at his peril neglect or
refuse to comply with the surety's request, particularly
since he may merely offer to permit the surety to bring
the suit in the creditor's name. "The rule is explicit, and
of course easily understood, and is eminently calculated to
prevent surprise."
Where the creditor is the holder of other obligations
which might be referred to by the notice to sue, the notice
is insufficient if it does not clearly show the instrument
upon which suit is requested. 7 A notice given before the
515 S. & R. 28, (1826).
61 Watts 143, (1832). See also Greenawalt v. Kreider, 3 Pa. 264,
(1846) and First Nat. Bk. of Hanover v. Delone, 254 Pa. 409, 421,
(1916).
7Wolleshlare v. Searles, 45 Pa. 45, (1863); Hellen v. Crawford,
44 Pa. 105, (1862).
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instrument becomes due may be safely disregarded.8 The
reason given is that such a notice is a substitute for a bill
in equity and a bill could not be filed until the debt was
due and unpaid. The contrary rule would require a creditor
"to keep a separate book for entering such notices."
In Conrad v. Foy,9 Justice Agnew insisted that the
creditor must be able to act at once upon the request and
repeated Tilghrnan's suggestion that "in justice the notice
ought to be in writing and in the most explicit terms. But
prior decisions have not required this, and we cannot legislate such a rule into existence."
In Strickler v. Burkholder,1" it was held that a notice
"to collect" is unequivocal. "Notice to collect is notice to
sue, if suit be necessary for collection." This decision was
evidently in the mind of the legislature when the Act of
May 14, 1874, P. L. 157,11 was enacted for the language of
the statute is:
"The surety or sureties in any instrument in writing for the forbearance or payment of money at any
future time, shall not be discharged from their liability
upon the same, by reason of notice from the surety or
sureties, to the creditor or creditors, to collect the
amount thereof from the principal in said instruments,
unless such notice shall be in writing and signed by
the party giving the same."
The same case holds that there is no burden on the
surety to show that the money could have been collected
from the principal. The presumption is that the money
could have been made. But the creditor may prove the
contrary, if he can.
Though the Pennsylvania rule giving effect to a notice
to collect was founded upon the absence of equity powers
in our courts and though at the date of the last mentioned
decision equity powers had been conferred over a variety
of subjects, it was held that, admitting that the rule opens
a door for mischief and that it sometimes works injustice,
it had been too long established and adhered to, to be
abolished by judicial decision.
sFidler v. Hershey, 90 Pa. 363, (1879). See Kemmerer v. Yoder,
1 Woodw. 41, (1862) contra, where the notice was given immediately
before the note became due.
968 Pa. 381, (1871).
1047 Pa. 476, (1864)-an appeal from Cumberland County, Judge

Graham affirmed.
114

Purdon 4520; 3 Purdon 3660.
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In Wetzel v. Sponsler's Exrx.," Chief Justice Black laid
down five rules governing cases of this type. 1. A general
agent of the surety may give the notice to sue without
special authority to do so. This is his duty in a proper
case. 2. The notice may be given to an agent or attorney
of the creditor, in whose hands the creditor has left the
obligation for collection. 3. The notice need not be accompanied by a tender of expenses or a stipulation to pay
them or an offer to take the obligation and bring suit,
"unless the creditor at the time of the notice expressly puts
his refusal to sue on the ground of the trouble and expense, and offers to proceed if that objection be removed."
4. If the principal debtor's financial condition becomes impaired after the notice, the surety is discharged. 5. The
creditor must sue immediately and must press his suit with
diligence and do everything which a prudent man would
do to save himself.
1
The last mentioned case is followed in Stark v. Fuller,
in which Judge Woodward observes: "A guarantor or
surety is entitled to reasonable protection. He has a right
to expect that the creditor will not wantonly lose or destroy
his claim against the principal debtor with a view of falling
back upon the liability of the guarantor. If the request of
the surety be accompanied with explicit declaration, that
if suit be not brought he will consider himself discharged,
a surety or guarantor will be discharged."
That the "explicit declaration" is an essential part of
an effective notice has been reiterated in many cases."'
Whether the right of a surety to discharge his obligation by notice to the creditor is to be determined by the
lex fori or by the lex loci contractus or by the law of the
place of performance turns upon whether the rule relates
to the remedy or to the nature of the obligation assumed
by the surety. In Tenant v. Tenant, 5 it was held to go to
the very root of the surety's obligation and to render the
surety's obligation one of a conditional character.
J. P. McKeehan
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Pa. 460, (1852)-another appeal from Cumberland County,

Judge Watts affirmed.

Followed in Thomas v. Mann, 28 Pa. 520,

(1857) as to notice to counsel.
342 Pa. 320, (1862).
' 4 First National Bank of Hanover v. Delone, 254 Pa. 409, 421,
(1916) and cases therein cited. And see 30 A. L. R. 1285 for elaborate

note as to purport of notice.
25110 Pa. 478, 485, (1885).

